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THE CONCENTRIC MERGER AND SECTION
7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
RICHARD A. SOLOMON*
"The time has come, the walrus said, to speak of many things -
of ships and sails and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings."' In many of
today's industrial complexes, the foregoing could be a quote from the
notice to directors to attend a forthcoming board meeting. Whether the
free-form conglomerate corporation is a viable concept or merely one of
the neuroses of the times, like free love and LSD, is not yet known. So
diverse have been the short-run results of conglomerate enterprise that
almost anyone's ideas as to why things go wrong or right are as good as
anyone else's. What we do know is that many are afraid of conglomerates -
afraid that diversity in the extreme cannot be controlled (in terms of
successful operations); 2 afraid of the ways in which operating results are
described to the investing public; afraid of the securities these firms sell
in the market;8 and, of course, afraid that anything that big and that
*Member of the Michigan Bar. A.B., Citadel, 1959; LL.B., University of Michigan,
1963. Advisory Board, BNA Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report.
1 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, in ALIcE IN WONDERLAND 164 (Pocket
Book ed. 1951).
2 The conglomerate concept begins with an idea that all businesses have a basic
kinship-money-and that basic management skills are transferable from firm to firm
regardless of industry lines. Poly-centristic pragmatism then becomes the rationale of
the free-form management group. Added stimulus is provided by a legal environment in
which diversification is the only avenue left open to the acquisitive. See United States v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). No
doubt this philosophy is held by many in full credence and with utmost good faith.
This urge to merge, however, may have a tendency to become an end in itself. "What
many conglomerators are doing is not paying sufficient attention to the necessity for
operating successfully in mundane profit-and-loss terms when the creative acquiring is
over." Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 79. Some
writers would even challenge management bona fides in these premises, seeing mergers
as symptoms of management megalomania. See M. MACE & G. MONTGOMERY, MANAGE-
MENT PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS (1962); Boulding, The Present Position of
the Theory of the Firm, in LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (K.
Boulding & W. Spivey eds. 1960); Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral,
Managerial, 57 Am. ECON. REV. 1 (1967); Papandreou, Some Basic Problems in the
Theory of the Firm, in II A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 183 (B. Haley ed.
1952). As to effects upon executive compensation of firm size rather than profitability, see
McGuire, Chiu & Elbing, Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 753
(1962). See also Bossons, Cohen & Reid, Mergers for Whom-Managers or Stockholders?,
in Workshop on Capital Market Equilibrating Processes (Paper No. 14, Carnegie Inst.
Tech. 1966).
8 The Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants is seeking to abolish pooling-of-interest accounting for acquisitions. Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 31, 1969, at 7, col. 2. See also Day of Reckoning?, Barrons, April 3, 1967, at
3; Reid, The Conglomerate Merger: A Special Case, 2 ANIR1RUST LAW K- EcON. REV. 141,
161-62 (1968).
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diffuse must possess some inherent powers to control the environments
in which they operate in ways inimical to the national policy favoring
competition as the ultimate economic regulator and resource allocator.
And while fear does serve to start the adrenalin flowing, its self-escalation
tends to frustrate any attempt to place the conglomerate phenomenon in
its historical economic context and to study it on the basis of empirical
data as that data are generated.
We are dealing with conglomerates, therefore, on the basis of broadly
enunciated philosophies as to what is possible. And in that vein it would
appear that harm is equally as possible as benefit in terms of the ultimate
contribution, negative or positive, of these firms to economic and social
well-being.
Could it be that the conglomerate is a paper tiger? Even if the
answer is yes - and I suspect that in most cases that will prove to be
true- it can still be a damage-generating instrument. While many con-
glomerate firms may be practically impotent in terms of market power,
they may, perhaps because of this, be dangerous from the point of view
of the spectacular nature of their failures4 -failures which may not be
predictable sufficiently in advance of the fact to permit efforts to thwart
financial ruin of public and private investors. But this type of danger
should be approached as financial regulation, not as market power regula-
tion.
It shall be the purpose of this article to suggest that there is a great
deal of erratic movement by those whose fear of conglomerates has led
them to be the most vociferous in that premise. It is to be conceded that
some of the response to this cacophony of invective has been less than
enlightened and this has certainly not helped matters. 5
There is a necessity that there be a capital market. Taxation and
many other factors7 require that many businesses must be sold, either to
the public or to another firm. This is a positive necessity. There is also
4 See Burck, supra note 2. See also General Dynamics: In Trouble Again, Bus, WEEK,
Oct. 4, 1969, at 48; Ruckeyser, Why Rain Fell on "Automatic" Sprinkler, FORTUNE, May
1969, at 88.
5 "The fact that the Supreme Court does not always hit home runs should not,
therefore, surprise. And for what it is worth, the critics aren't hitting many either."
Zimmerman, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Criticism of the Critics, 84
ANTITRUST L.J. 42, 49 (1967).
6 See J. BUEmRs, J. LINTNER & W. CARY, EFFECTs OF TAXATXON ON CORPORATE MElt-
GELS (1950); Lintner & Butters, Effects of Taxes on Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCEN-
TRATION AND PRICE POLICY 239 (G. Stigler ed. 1955).
7 In most, but not all, of the cases studied the one single factor which char-
acterized the decisions to sell was fear: fear about the future; fear that the
product line was outmoded; fear that while company-rich although cash poor,
the capital accumulated in a lifetime would be lost; fear that technology once
reasonably simple was beyond the management's capacity to cope with; fear that
key people were becoming dissatisfied with salary compensation and would leave
to join enterprises where capital participation was possible.
M. MACE & M. MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 33.
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a congeneric negative necessity -that the disposition of capital assets not
occur in such a way as to contravene our preference for vigorous compe-
tition. There are two avenues of approach to this negative necessity-
behavior (performance?) and structure. How these approaches meld (as
well as where they do not meld) in the applicability of section 7 of the
Clayton Act8 to conglomerate mergers9 is our inquiry.
The structuralists among us, and they are legion, share the basic
precept that little if any good can come from trends toward concentration
of ownership of productive assets in fewer and fewer hands. All non-
monarchists must concede that a point could be reached at which economic
and socio-political evils do spring from oligopoly; indeed, these evils
would begin to manifest themselves substantially before the point were
reached at which a small group of "friends" controlled the economy. It
is quite likely that, considering the scale and sophistication of the econ-
omy at large at the end of the nineteenth century, we may have been well
within that dangerous area of domination by the few. While we busted
some important trusts and loosened the stranglehold somewhat, there
8 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964):
No corporation . . . shall acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock ...
or any . . . of the assets of another corporation . . . where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
9 Defining the term conglomerate as applied to mergers has itself been the subject of
diversity. S. OPPENHEIM & J. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 323-24 (3d ed. 1968),
indicates that the conventional definition includes all mergers that are neither horizontal
nor vertical. They go on to point out some refinements in this definitional process, how-
ever. Professor Reid avers that to define conglomerate mergers as the residue left after
accounting for horizontal and vertical mergers complicates analysis of the conglomerate
phenomenon in terms of performance. Reid, supra note 3, at 142.
Kaysen and Turner assert that most mergers that appear superficially to be con-
glomerate will prove to have vertical or horizontal elements or both if the markets
involved are carefully analyzed and defined. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
131 (1959). There is, therefore, a gray area between the purely horizontal or vertical
merger on one hand, and the pure conglomerate where the firms are totally unrelated
on the other. This includes the market extension merger and the product extension
merger. The market extension merger is but a horizontal merger between firms that
happen not to operate in the same geographic area. Their close kinship to the horizontal
merger tends to place them in special jeopardy under section 7. See Beatrice Foods Co.,
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,244 (FTC 1965); Foremost Dairies,
Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,877 (FTC 1962); Bicks, Con-
glomerates and Diversification Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 ANTITRUST BULL.
175,177 (1956). Product extension mergers, bringing together firms with different products,
are undoubtedly those which at first glance appear to be pure conglomerates. Where,
however, the products of the combining firms are either technologically related or are
sold into the same markets, they may fall short of the mark. In this article I shall use
the term concentric to designate the product extension merger. See Reid, supra note 3,
at 142. Where the products of the merging firms are not necessarily related in tech-
nology, but are sold into the same markets, I shall use the term converging concentric.
And where the products of the combining firms are technologically related, but are sold
into different markets, I shall use the term diverging concentric. See W. THORP & W.
CROWD R, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph No. 27, 1941).
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followed wave upon wave of mergers, 10 first horizontal and vertical, and,
by the 1960's, conglomerate. Aggregate industrial concentration has grown
significantly over the past 65 years, but, due to the expanded scale of the
economy and the countervailing forces of such populist forces as organized
labor, we are not approaching a state of economic dominance by the few
in aggregate dimensions; even though Standard Oil is bigger now than
before it was broken up." Yet aggregate concentration is seen as a burgeon-
ing threat 'to the interests all and sundry, and there is a hue and cry to
bring section 7 cases to attack it.12 Indeed, such a theory is already part of
a complaint under section 7.13
Aggregate concentration analysis, however, does not address itself to
the problems of market power within the context of specific cases. The
statute speaks of "any line of commerce," and there is a measurable and
smaller cosmos which has relevance to a particular merger. The industries in
which the combining firms operate, those from which they buy and those
to which they sell, are the proper parameters of significant inquiry. If a
merger results in a firm which dominates or threatens realistically to
dominate or reorient an industry along non-competitive lines, then it
is of no consequence how much of the nation's productive assets are
controlled by how many firms. 14 The statutory problems are to be re-
10 An excellent review of the twentieth century history of aggregate concentration
is to be found in S. OPPENHEIM & J. WESTON, supra note 9, at 317-23. The insomniac
reader may wish to review, inter alia, R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY 1895-1956 (1959); C. NUTTER, THE EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1899-1939 (1951); J. WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE
FIRMS (1953); SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., lST SESS., CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1957); SUBCOMM.
ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D
SESS., CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1958, pts. I & II (1962); Hear-
ings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965); FTC, LARGE MER-
GERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1948-1967 (1968); FTC, MERGER ACTIVITY SET NEW
RECORD LAST YEAR (1968); FTC, REPORT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANUFACTUR-
ING, 1935 To 1947 AND 1950 (1954); FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
(1955); FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 1947 (1949);
FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1948); Blair & Houghton,
The Lintner-Butters Analysis of the Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration,
1940-47, A Reply, 33 REV. EcON. & STATS. 63 (1951); Lintner & Butters, Effects of Mergers
on Industrial Concentration, 1940-47, 32 REv. ECON. & STATS. 30 (1950).
11 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12 Address by R. W. Donnem, American Management Association, Nov. 10, 1969, in
5 TRADE REG. REP. 50, 263 (1969); see The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforce-
ment Policy, in SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY
105 (Comm. Print 1963).
13 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civ. No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
14 Many conclusions about concentration ratios on an at-large scale refer to census
of manufacturer's data. Presently available census of manufacturer's data has been
called unreliable as indicators of aggregate concentration in the manufacturing sector
because no attempt is made to cause this data to describe manufacturing assets or take
into account the United States market impact of imports or of goods manufactured
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solved within a smaller periphery. And if, within the context of a relevant
product or geographic market as traditionally' 5 found in merger cases,
the merger deserves sanction, the concentration questions are answered
without further inquiry.16 Finally, on the question of aggregate concentra-
tion, we have the question of honesty. If we are so violently opposed to it,
why is it that nothing is done about concentration and the already estab-
lished firm?17
If aggregate references are immaterial, then in what frame of reference
are we to evaluate notions of dimensions of firms? The courts and some
commentators are clear that broad spectrum industrial groupings are not
appropriate environments in which to measure the market power con-
notations of size distribution of firms. Each situation is evaluated from
a narrow, wave-length perspective usually limited to the products of the
combining companies.' Section 7 tradition,19 therefore, tells us that the
question is really what is the impact (now or later) of this merger upon
further market dynamism (read competition). To do that we must first
know the present state of the market, and here the structuralists have a
field day. We know that price fixing equates with monopoly, that predatory
price warfare may drive companies from the market, and that some forms
of patent abuse will have the same effect. However, certain market struc-
domestically but for foreign markets. If these data are to be made relevant to competitive
impact questions - vis-t-vis United States markets, significant adjustments should be
made. Illustratively, one writer asserts that after such adjustments it could be seen that
aggregate concentration in consumer products industries in the United States from 1954
forward tends to be static. Rose, Bigness is a Numbers Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 112.
15 It used to take more than 15 years for a practice to become a tradition.
16 As to the ultimate put-on vis-A-vis aggregate concentration see Rose, supra note 14.
To take an extreme example, if the 200 largest companies kept growing until
they accounted for all the manufacturing in the country, and if each diversified
to such an extent that all were equally represented in every market, then none
of the top 200 companies would account for more than 0.5 percent of sales in
any industry. The megacorps would be monstrously big, but none of them would
have any great amount of market power.
Id.
17 See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. Rv.
1289, 1297 (1948). Professor Adelman also claims that aggregate size and concentration
have no obvious or simple relation to market control, and, up to a point, this writer
agrees.
lS See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nati Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United
States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Some commentators (and all defendants
in section 7 cases) argue that the measurement of a relevant product should take into
account such broad spectrum alternatives. See Solomon, Why Uncle Sam Can't Lose a
Case Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137 (1967). Professor Adelman, with
whom Professor Bork would concur, asserts that our rise in living standards produces
more discretionary income for the consumer, which would tend to make diverse dis-
cretionary items competitive across a great breadth, e.g., the trip to Florida competing
with violin lessons for junior. Adelman, supra note 17, at 1296. But cf. Zimmerman,
supra note 5, at 44: "[T]hirsty golfers may not appreciate a chocolate bar."
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tures are characterized as competitively stagnant or about to be stagnant
according to the size distribution of firms, so they say.20 Behaviorists cling
to the notion that, short of duopoly the evil goals of feudalistic businessmen
should not be implied without evidence of improper conduct, and that
numbers, without more, are no indicia of market power.2 1 The empirical
data upon which we are now forming our conclusions about market
power are unclear,22 inadequate and untried.23 Of course, judges are
19 See note 15 supra.
20 Measurements of undesirable intra-market concentration - oligopoly power pres-
ent -vary from that which a lawyer should be able to deal with: C. KAYSEN & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 9, at 27- Type I Oligopoly, first 8 firms have 50 percent of the market
and the first 20 firms have 75 percent; Type 2 Oligopoly, first 8 firms have 33 percent of
the market and the rest is unconcentrated: J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1959)
-High concentration obtains when the first 8 firms have 70 percent of the market:
G. STIGLER, CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 57 (1963).
Unconcentrated markets exist when (1) the market is national and the 4 largest firms
account for less than 50 percent of its sales, or (2) the market is regional and the 4
largest firms have 20 percent. Accord, Nat'l Comm. on Food Marketing, Food From
Farmer to Consumer 93 (1966); for the more esoteric, we must call upon more expert
assistance. For an excellent discussion of summary indices of concentration, including the
Lorenz Curve, the Gini Coefficient, the Pietra Ratio, the relative mean deviation inter-
cept, and the Herfindahl Summary Index, see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (1968).
21 In the pure conglomerate merger, concentration ratios are not changed by the
fact of the acquisition. It is simply a change of ownership without economic significance
in the section 7 Clayton Act context. Reid, supra note 3, at 143.
22 Oligopolistic markets, for example, may be described in terms of demand curve
distortions. Whereas a seller under conditions of pure competition would construct a
demand curve that would tend to move more as a function of his own pricing, the seller
under oligopolistic conditions must take into consideration the additional dependent
variable of co-oligopolist reaction, with the result being a kinky demand curve. See
F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 352 (1952). See also L. TARSHIS,
THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (1947); Sweezy, Demand under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47
J. POL. ECON. 568-73 (1939). Kaysen and Turner also relate to this form of measurement.
We can identify market structure with the underlying forces that shape the
factor-supply and market-demand curves facing the firm. In the competitive
model, with the profit-maximizing firm which cannot influence the markets in
which it deals, the market-demand and factorsupply situations determine the
decisions of the firm.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 71 n.30. On the other hand, Chamberlin as-
serts that the description of imperfect competition by reference to a marginal revenue
curve is a mere historical accident. He concedes that there is intrinsic merit in marginal
curves in that their intersection reveals monopoly output better than the fitting of areas
between curves of average cost and average revenue (until you have to deal with the
single firm in isolation where the curves are beyond equilibrium), but that they do not
indicate price or profits. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
191-92 (7th ed. 1956). Another detractor of this approach is Harrod, whose thesis is that
the equating of marginal revenue and marginal cost is a general principle for the in-
dividual firm under any circumstances whatever. It is just another way to say that firms
attempt to maximize profits, and contributes nothing to distinguish imperfect competi-
tion from pure competition or monopoly. Harrod, Imperfect Competition and the
Trade Cycle, 18 REV. ECON. & STATS. 84 (1936). If the foregoing seems tedious, see SINGER,
supra note 20. But see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 279-80 n.200 (1960) to the effect that we cannot predict
at what concentration ratio administered pricing will begin.
23 See D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND TIE CLAYTON ACT (1959); Bok, supra note 22, at 227,
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ill-equipped to analyze masses of complex economic data as to probable
future effects upon competition of present or past mergers. Therefore,
in order to prevent bogging down the entire judicial process, the courts
have formulated simplistic, talismanic formulae and have cut the Gordian
knot as well as the throat of every defendant under amended section 7
who thought he would find justice on appeal.24 It is meant here to say,
more than just in passing, that the answer to the federal judiciary's
inability to deal with vast empirical data without clogging the dockets
desperately requires the establishment of a special antitrust court as a
part of the federal court system. It is not sufficient to analogize con-
glomerate merger matters to per se violations of the Sherman Act in
which no extended inquiry is appropriate. Structure and behavior, though
liminally related, do not with equal ease accommodate themselves to short
shrift treatment. Professor Mason's comment that "[t]he demand for full
investigation of the consequences of a market situation or a course of
business conduct is a demand for nonenforcement of the antitrust laws" 25
is a search for an easy way out, and too great an economic and personal
commitment is made by the parties in a conglomerate merger to permit
their interests to be dealt with in such a cavalier fashion.
And yet it is, of course, insufficient merely to criticize without an
offer of help. Certain structural relationships do have within their inter-
stices the potential to result in restricted competition. I suggest, however,
that a good deal of the anticompetitive implications inherent in oligopoly
are not controllable only by divestiture, as has been so frequently claimed.26
Neither is the achievement of monopolistic behavior a necessary hand-
maiden of size. Several aspects of structure and behavior have been
highlighted in the section 7 cases, and, depending upon the business facts
240-41, 279; Ruggles, The Value of Value Theory, 44 AM. ECON. REv. 140 (1954); Address
by Commissioner Elman of the FTC, ABA Nat'l Inst. on Conglomerate and Other
Modern Merger Movements, Oct. 1969.
We recognize the need for further refinement of economic evidence .. . and for
additional knowledge, theoretical and empirical, about the behavior of oligopolis-
tic industries. It would be less than candid to pretend that economic science has
provided a complete or wholly satisfactory basis for public policy in this field.
1968 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REC. 5642,
5644-45 (daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
24 See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 129-30; Bicks, supra note 9, at 181;
Bok, supra note 22, at 227; Lasky, Proof of Complicated Economic and Technical Facts
and Handling of Documents, 23 F.R.D. 606 (1958); Neal, The Clayton Act and the
Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179, 185-87 (1953).
25 Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 AM. ECON. REV.
471, 478 (1956), See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1964);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313 (1949); Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-
1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
26 See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 850 (1961);
Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948); United States
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); Elzinga, The Antimerger Law:
Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. LAw & ECON. 43, 55-59, 68, 74 (1969).
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of the particular merger, they may appear to have less serious antitrust
implications than our present summary disposition of cases assumes.27
The objections to large firm conglomerate acquisitive entry into an
industry2 evolve around two basic issues: (1) whether the mere fact of
entry by merger, or the mere presence of the entrant, tend to transform
the market into one in which competitive behavior is retarded (or, if
the entered market is devoid of price competition prior to entry, whether
that condition is aggravated by the merger); and (2) whether by dint of
size and participation in other markets, the merging entrant is a threat
to the continued viability of other firms or to the additional entry of
other firms.
THE THREAT OF RATIONALIZED PRICING
The relationship of market structure to pricing behavior29 is claimed
to be a function either of fear3° or of controllable conspiracy.31 The
27 The writer realizes that libraries can be filled with the literature already extant
in this area, and every effort will be made to avoid their unnecessary repetition.
28The reference here is limited to concentric mergers, whether convergent or
divergent. Geographic market extension mergers (also generally included within the
conglomerate category) too closely resemble horizontal mergers, as previously noted,
and are thereby more immediate eliminators of actual competition. In that posture
they are not and should not be given special consideration as a new phenomenon.
29 That there is no incentive for the oligopolist to engage in price competition
rests upon the assumption that the oligopolist expects his competitors to fol-
low suit whenever he reduces his prices, but not to match his price increases.
The resulting high elasticity of demand (large losses of sales) at higher prices
and low elasticity of demand (small gains in sales) at prices lower than the pre-
vailing level can explain why the oligopolist would not want to change his price
even if his costs went up or down.
Machlup, Oligopoly and the Free Society, 1 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 11, 19 (1967).
"When one firm has forty to fifty percent or more . . . competition will seldom plague
the industry." Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176,
181 (1955). See also United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172 (1964); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-
1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,244 (FTC 1965); Procter & Gamble Co.,
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,675 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S. 568
(1967); G. MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 94 (1962).
SI Professor Bok suggests that oligopoly behavior, as a result of entry by a large
firm, is a function of the smaller competitors subjectively recognizing the new firm as
a retaliation threat. Bok, supra note 22, at 280. This recognition is supposed to be the
point of dominance by the entrant. See also F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLES'
COMPETITION 352-53 (1952); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46
GEo. L.J. 672, 689-91 (1958); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1359 (1965).
31 Obviously, the likelihood is that some conspirators will break the price line
as the number of conspirators increases. Assuming addiction to conspiratorial con-
duct, therefore, Professor Stigler may suggest that at least 50 percent of sales in an industry
be accounted for by at least enough people to overcrowd the average hotel room. See
Stigler, supra note 29, at 180; "People of the same trade seldom meet together even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public or in some contrivance to raise prices." I A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 128
(Modern Library ed. 1937). See J. BLAIR, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 297-98 (1959); W.
FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW 282-88 (1949); Machlup, supra note 29, at 16;
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market in this context is a two dimensional environment, that is, it is
said to be influenced in its pricing performance by those actively engaged
in head to head competition in the market, as well as by those firms
hovering on the fringes in the role of potential entrants. 82
Several cases in which the issue of potential merger-resulting price
rationalization played a significant role have already been litigated under
section 7, but they were, in all but one instance, other than convergent
concentric mergers.8 In the one true product extension case,8 4 convergent
concentricity, if present at all, was present by virtue of unrealistic defini-
tions, because the product technology of the entered product market was
closely parallel to the areas of technical expertise of the acquirer. These
cases, therefore, are not fertile ground in which to plant theories of
price rationalization resulting from acquisitive entry. Even if we assume
Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 891
(1951).
82 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964). The fringe
area firm is often viewed as materially present notwithstanding that it sells nothing
in the market because its presence tends to force industry members to keep prices down
to entry-discouraging levels. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 464-66
(1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 660 (1964); Beatrice Foods
Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REm. REP. 17,244 (FTC 1965); Hines, Effec-
tiveness of "Entry" by Already Established Firms, 71 Q.J. EcoN. 132, 142-45 (1957); cf.
Turner, supra note 30, at 1362, to the effect that where the market is already sufficiently
competitive to enforce competitive behavior upon its members, that behavior will not
be influenced by the threat of new entry. Obviously, therefore, price levels in the com-
petitive model are supposed to be below that necessary to discourage new entry. That
this can be harmonized with the desire to encourage new entry of course assumes that
the competitive model is unconcentrated in the sense of size distribution of firms. See
J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPFrrrsON 145 (1956), and, whereas assumed increased
entry barriers resulting from a merger may condemn it under section 7, Procter &
Gamble Co. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963), aff'd,
386 U.S. 568 (1967), the absence of entry barriers is not necessarily an exonerating
element. Ekco Products Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,879 (FTC
1964), afi'd, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
83 Brown Shoe - vertical
El Paso Natural Gas - market extension
Continental Can- horizontal (though products differed technologically, they were
found to be in direct competition)
Alcoa (Rome)- vertical
Alcoa (Cupples) - vertical
Penn-Olin -market extension (technically not a merger case, but joint venture
case)
Philadelphia National Bank- horizontal
Beatrice Foods- market extension
Ekco Products Co. - horizontal
Reynolds Metals Co.- vertical (In this case price warfare after the merger did re-
sult in injury to competitors and competition, but I suggest that the, facts are
unusual and that Arrow's post-merger management's handling of the matter was
atypical.)
Consolidated Foods- product extension, but with reciprocity potential which will
be discussed, infra, and in the RELIEF section of this article.
84Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox), [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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that such entry by the large firm in the vertical or horizontal context
threatens the future dynamism of price competition in the relevant market,
it is a non sequitur to ascribe those attributes to the true concentric
merger. Here we do not have a case of meager empirical evidence to sub-
stantiate economists' hypotheses; there is no evidence at all. In fact, from
the point of view of the entering firm's impact, that firm is more likely to
tread lightly or not at all with whatever market power is supposed to be
included in its size, as a function of its unfamiliarity with the business.
The proposition that, upon achieving such familiarity, it will be
a threat to price competition carries with it two serious implications. First,
parallel pricing is only very rarely achievable without acts of conspiracyA5
Secondly, it is impractical and illogical to assume in this day and age
that a manager of any sophistication will intentionally wreck his operating
results across the entire expanse of his geographical distribution area
in an entire product line in order to achieve unrivaled dominance, even
if the Robinson-Patman Act is not being enforced. 36 The management
and profit-and-loss responsibility in the conglomerate model does not
permit such grandiose power plays. Notions that this type of action is
a substantial probability in the true product extension setting may have
been viable at the turn of the century when investment spending realis-
tically included predatory pricing costs, but that was another world, 7
In addition, the impact of evolving techniques of accounting for profit-
ability which are tending to require divisional and product-line isolation
of results will serve to make it more apparent when a company is pouring
resources into loss operations, whether or not for predatory purposes. Such
a trend will make it even more unlikely to subsidize losses as a way to
seek immunity from competition, 8 if not from a Robinson-Patman Act
35Even in cases which deal with conspiracy, one of the most frequent types of
conspiratorial conduct is the communication in which an errant conspirator is being
admonished to get back in line. See, e.g., DeMaree, How Judgment Came for the
Plumbing Conspirators, FORTUNE, Dec. 1969, at 95.
36 See ENFORCEMENT section, infra.
37See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1932). There was still
a dinosaur in our midst as recently as 1966, but its extinction was assured by the
Government with additional treble damage actions that should, between them, loosen
that market dramatically. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also E. SINGER,
supra note 20, at 261.
38 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG., REC.
6472 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT]; Anti-
trust Policy and the Conglomerates, Address by George Stigler, McDonnell Inst. Research
Conf., June 30, 1969. But cf. FTC, REPORT ON THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY pt. 5 (1920)
(note the date); A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 451 (1936); C. EDWARDS, MAIN-
TAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENT POLICY 159 (1949); A. KAPLIN, BIG
ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 216 (rev. ed. 1964); Blair, supra note 30, at 688;
Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Policy upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U, PA. L.
REV. 320, 364 (1950) (who characterizes this conclusion by saying that subsidization can be
accomplished by any firm with money, regardless of diversification or mode of entry, idi.
at 346-55); Turner, supra note 30, at 1339-48.
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perspective, at least from the viewpoint of the institutional investor in
the company's securities, who is unlikely to view that phenomenon as good
speculation.
OTHER FORMS OF LEVERAGE
Subsidization of predatory price cutting, as noted above in the con-
glomerate setting, is seen as a form of leveraging market positions; the
rationale being that a firm's power in various markets may be cumulated
for the purpose of directing decisive competitive thrusts in a particular
market. 89 Since price is but one factor in competition, economists and
tribunals have theorized as to how leveraging can be applied to other
competitive tools. These other implements of business activity include
advertising and promotion, tie-in sales or full-line forcing, the role of
efficiencies or scale economies, purchasing, access to capital, and reciprocity
power.
Advertising, especially since the Procter & Gamble - Clorox40 case,
has received a great deal of special attention vis-A-vis the conglomerate
phenomenon in the setting of consumer products markets. The first
judicial assertion in a modern case that advertising expenditure levels
could affect competition within a market as well as the ability of new
firms to enter successfully was, of course, the Supreme Court's statement
in American Tobacco Co. v. United States.41 We have now reached what
may be a stage of intense over-reaction on this subject with the possible
result being the assumption of major policy positions that could injure
advertising as a useful institution.42 In addition, whether there is room
39 Leverage is viewed as multi-directional phenomenon. In the vertical acquisition
context it is seen as one stage of production subsidizing a later stage. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Cupples),
223 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv.
L. REv. 29, 44 (1949). It is viewed as identical in both the horizontal and the market
extension merger setting. Id. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344
(1962) (merger with both vertical and horizontal aspects); Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17.244 (FTC 1965); Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1961-
1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE iEC. REP. 15,877 (FTC 1962). In the concentric merger
setting, inter-product relationships may tend to weaken the argument somewhat about
the transferability of market power as well as its cumulative effect. See Edwards, Con-
glomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
344-48 (G. Stigler ed. 1955); Stigler, supra note 29, at 184. But see C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, supra note 9, at 135. "The only leverage in a merger of this kind [conglomerate]
is the leverage of money. Many firms without significant market power have plenty of
money." See also Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 103; Clemens,
Price Discrimination and the Multi-Product Firm, 19 REv. ECON. STUDIES 1, 8 (1950).
40 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S.
568 (1967).
41 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
42 "Advertising performs a socially and economically useful function insofar as it
educates the consumer to the broad range of product alternatives that he should consider
in seeking to make an optimal allocation of his necessarily limited economic resources."
Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,586
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within the ambit of antitrust considerations to evaluate the social merits
of advertising is in great doubt- in this context those arguments tend
to be epithetical rather than valuable. 43 It is not contended here that
advertising (including non-media promotion) is not capable of abuse.
On the contrary, the well endowed brutal competitor would turn naturally
to this tool in no-quarter warfare. 44 Whether, however, no-quarter warfare
is a real and present danger in a sophisticated age is at best doubtful. In
addition, the relevance of aggregate dollars spendable on advertising by a
firm is questioned by experts,45 and the leverageability of advertising in
the true concentric merger is but a matter of pure conjecture at this
stage.46
None of the leading cases under amended section 7 deal with tie-in
selling or full-line forcing as an issue. Though an early case was faced
with such an issue,47 the Court approved the merger on the grounds that
the merging firms were not competitors. From that time, 1913, until 1936,48
tie-in selling was virtually ignored in any context. Since 1936, however, it
has received significant attention in the Sherman Act setting as well as
under section 3 of the Clayton Act where the "commodity" test is met.49
(FTC 1963) (Commissioner Elman, Opinion). "[C]ost advantages of scale are of more
than one kind, and . . . the kind involved in this merger [advertising], far from repre-
senting a net social benefit, is independently offensive to at least the spirit, if not the
letter, of the antitrust laws." Id. at 21,585 (Commissioner Elman, Opinion).
43 "[P]romotional expenditures by rival sellers which are mutually self-cancelling, so
that the demand curves of the sellers are the same after the expenditures as they would
have been without them, can also be termed dearly wasteful." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
supra note 9, at 69. See also Turner, supra note 30; cf. Relief in Advertising Antitrust
Cases, Lecture by Richard Solomon, NICB Workshop, Advertising & Antitrust, New York
City, 1968.
44 See the discussion of the Clorox-Purex battle for Erie, Pennsylvania, in Procter &
Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,563, 21,576,
21,578, 21,583 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
45 J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 44 (1967); J. DEAN, MANAGERIAL Eco-
NOMICS 354-55 (1951); Schachte, The View from the Market Place, 26 ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION 160 (1964); Telsar, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537, 556, 558
(1964); Tenant, An Economist's View, 26 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 168 (1964). On product
failure despite heavy expenditures for advertising, see Schorr, Many Products Fizzle
Despite Careful Planning, Publicity, in CONTEMP. AM. MARKETING 113 (1962). On brand
loyalty, see Cunningham, Brand Loyalty-what, where, how much?, HARv. Bus REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1956, at 116; Cunningham, Customer Loyalty to Store and Brand, HAsv. Bus.
REv., Nov.-Dec. 1961, at 127, 134. But see J. BAIN, supra note 32, at 240, 250, 820;
Bain, Advantages of the Large Firm: Production, Distribution and Sales Promotion, 20
J. MARKETING 336 (1956).
48 Even in the matter of Procter & Gamble- Clorox it is notable that, despite the
fact that P & G was the nation's largest advertiser, with a long record of intense media
use, there was no note of efforts by P & G to transfer any of the brand identities to
the Clorox trademark. The impact of the Commission's and the Court's position in
that case, therefore, was merely aggregate dollars and efficiencies (which will be dis-
cussed infra). That dollars are mobile, alas, must be conceded.
47 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
4s International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
49 Compare International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936)
with Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); United
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Basically this practice requires special kinds of dependence by the buyer
upon particular products or services attainable only from the individual
seller. That this dependence can occur as a firm's multiple mergers become
more diverse must be conceded. That it should become a reason for
preventing or undoing a merger is highly doubtful, as will be explained
under the relief section of this article. Closely related to full-line forcing,
of course, is exclusive dealing, and indeed, it was exclusive dealing case
law that generated the quantitative substantiality rationale based upon
structure and size distribution of firms that now permeates section 7
thinking.50 Exclusive dealing, like tie-ins and full-line forcing, does not
appear to be a danger in the section 7 context. It must be remembered
that section 7 looks toward potentialities, and in that regard it should
also take into account that the law on many behavior questions is well
established and well known. Notwithstanding the intensity of price fixing
conspiracies in the face of the fact that it is also well known that such
acts are per se violations of the Sherman Act, one distinction must be borne
in mind. Few industries, relatively speaking, are amenable to exclusive
dealing or full-line forcing. These practices, to be imposable by a seller,
require a special dependence on that seller that is a function of the absence
of vertical countervailing power combined with a "special asset" (trade-
mark, patent, unique product, etc.). These considerations are uniquely
irrelevant in the convergent concentric merger, and totally impossible in
the divergent concentric setting.
A sonorous dialogue is currently raging between Professor Bork of
the Yale Law School5' and structuralists as to the role that should be
played by merger-resulting efficiencies in section 7 cases of conglomerate
character. With due deference to the magnitude of the credentials on both
sides of this issue, I suggest that they both may be missing the point; the
point (or points) being that very little evidence 52 has yet been generated
vis-A-vis the degree of efficiencies achievable through such mergers in the
first instance, and the significance of its impact, if any, in the second. In
the conglomerate context, except for the handling of money, it is in great
doubt, despite public pronouncements by management people, that efficien-
des are a prime motivating factor in the decision to merge.53 And, with
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618
(1941); United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951). See also Hale, supra note 38. Similar problems may, of course, be dealt with under
section 5 of the FTC Act as "unfair methods of competition." See FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,
393 U.S. 223 (1968). On the other hand, see Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 504 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S.
125 (1965).
50 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also Bok, supra note 22.
51 Bork, supra note 39.
52 "[A]Imost any statement on economies of scale rests on an unsteady base since
the theory . . . of firm optimality is still an unsatisfactory notion in economics."
Elzinga, Mergers: Their Causes and Cures, 2 ANTrrmusT LAw & EcoN. REv. 53, 64-65 (1968).
53 Id. at 65-66. See also Gort, Diversification Mergers and Profits, in THE CORPORATE
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some frequency, it is being learned that a great fallacy of the finance
motivated conglomerate merger is that in order to achieve hoped for
improvements in financial planning and control, as well as improved re-
source allocation in the acquired firm, the acquirer assumes complete
financial risks of operations in a market in which it has no expertise in
management whatever.54 The idea that anyone with an M.B.A. degree who
can construct an econometric model on a computer can operate any business
on earth should not commend itself to people with experience.
In the concentric conglomerate merger there is no inherent merger-
resulting efficiency from the perspective of its defensive use under the anti-
trust laws in some very important areas. (Ultimately we are speaking of
dollars saved which, regardless of source, can be used elsewhere.) First, as to
production, the conglomerate merger entails less in acquisition-resulting effi-
ciency than the horizontal merger, because there is no pooling of production
skills and know-how, or the opportunity to close down less efficient facilities
or to centralize production. There is no production economy in the sense of
causing a move to a lower point on the firm's average cost curve.55 On the
management side, the point is rapidly reached at which efficiencies attained
by spreading management resources across a broad expanse of diverse ac-
tivities are offset by management's specialization loss.06 The merger, there-
fore, can contribute economies only to the extent that in some areas the firm
can obtain factors of production, marketing services or capital more cheaply
than before the merger. This may be highly desirable, provided these are
true economies and not merely the exercise of monopsony power. To make
sense, however, from the purely business perspective, there must be a positive
impact on overall firm profitability, or the entire conglomerate effort is
meaningless. In that case the antitrust implications of the conglomerate
phenomenon pale before the high probability that the movement will col-
lapse of its own weight long before adverse competitive effects in particular
markets become a threat. 57
MERGER 31, 33 (W. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1961); Heflebower, Corporate Mergers, Policy
and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. ECON. 537, 556 (1963); Markham, Survey of the Evidence
and Findings on Mergers, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 141, 180-81 (G.
Stigler ed. 1955); R. NELSON, supra note 10, at 103-04; Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly
by Mergers, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 23, 24 (1950); cf. J. WESTON, supra note 10, at 62-85.
54 Elzinga, supra note 52.
55 Blair, supra note 30. But cf. Clemens, supra note 39. Clemens' thesis is that
tranferability of resources between products within the firm is much greater than is
commonly assumed in economic treatises.
56 Blair, supra note 30, at 680.
57 To date, most of our information on firm profitability that is of antitrust sig-
nificance has to do with size rather than diversity. See FTC, RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF
LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED AND SMALL BUSINESS (TNEC Monograph No, 13, 1941); Adelman,
supra note 17; Dirks, Wartime Earnings of Small Business, 31 FED. RES. BULL. 16 (1945);
Dirks, Wartime Financing of Manufacturing and Trade Concerns, 31 FED. RES. BULL.
313 (1945); Koch & Schmidt, Financial Position of Manufacturing and Trade in Relation
to Size and Profitability, 33 FED. RES. BULL. 1091 (1947); Koch & Stockwell, The Postwar
Financial Position of Business, 32 FED. RES. BULL. 1335 (1946); McConnell, Corporate
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Before examining the significance, if any, of that stage of production or
selling at which efficiencies might arise, we are met with the question of the
subjective choice of priorities between the general concepts of efficiency and
competition. No remarks about the role of efficiencies here would be com-
plete without reference to Judge Hand's analysis in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America.58 Judge Hand, speaking in the context of the Sherman
Act stated:
[T]hroughout the history of these statutes [the federal antitrust laws] it
has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organiza-
tion of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other. 59
It is seriously questioned whether that comment has relevance as one moves
further and further away from the single firm dominance problem in the
Alcoa case. Certainly, as we approach the concentric merger, that question
must be restated and its traditional answer reevaluated in terms of the
definition of the small unit today and what we may practically expect within
a definition of effective competition. Fortunately, this question has had
some attention,6 0 and the relationship of market power and efficiency should
receive a great deal more prior to broad pronouncements in judicial opinions
based upon heretofore nonexistent empirical data.
The highway we are presently travelling in section 7 cases involves
Earnings by Size of Firm, SURVEy OF CURRENT Bus., May 1945, at 6; Warner, Financial
Developments in Manufacturing and Trade in 1944, 31 FED. REs. BULL. 1191 (1945).
58 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
59 Id. at 429.
60 Professor Bork takes a broad brush approach and asserts that a willingness to
incur added costs resulting from assumed small firm inefficiencies in order to preserve
atomistically structured markets is as improper a manipulation of the economy as
monopoly practices. Bork, supra note 39. Hale would exonerate efficiency generating
mergers where the behavioral antitrust statutes (section 1, Sherman Act; section 5, FTC
Act; sections 2, 3 Clayton Act) could be used to curb abuses. Hale, supra note 38, at 364.
Ironically, Professors Kaysen & Turner, though speaking in a Sherman Act context, seem
to have thought about this issue along parallel lines with Professor Adelman:
rnn so far as reduction of market power is incompatible with efficiency and pro-
gressiveness, we subordinate the first goal to the second. If, for example, the
efficient scale of operation in a particular market is so large in relation to the
size of the market that efficient firms are so few in number as to make their
possession of market power likely, and the reduction of market power cannot
be achieved except at the cost of a substantial loss in efficiency, our policy would
call for no action against the power itself.
C. KAYSEN & Di TURNER, supra note 9, at 45. "A more promising line of inquiry
would be to discover the minimum size of firm needed to operate efficiently in a given
industry." Adelman, supra note 17, at 1292. Kaysen & Turner do back off slightly on
the same issue in the section 7 setting. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 129.
The extreme position, which would counterbalance Professor Bork, is that, assuming
no inherent efficiency advantage in the large firm over a small firm that could achieve
scale economy in a given industry, the large firm will be kept from achieving and con-
ferring benefits of efficiencies because of monopolistic practices. J. STRINDL, SMALL AND
BIG BUsINESS (1945). See also Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument for
Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 567 (1947).
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characterizing efficiencies according to the phase of firm operations in which
they arise.61 This approach ignores the crude fact that scale economies mean
dollars, and a dollar is as spendable in production as it may be in adver-
tising and promotion, selling or any place else.
An important question, assuming the presence of merger-resulting effi-
ciencies in the concentric merger, is what can the firm do with these extra
dollars. It is generally assumed by the structuralists that this money will be
used to drive competitors out of business and prevent others from entering
the market. Actually there are three possibilities. The super-efficient firm
may treat these savings as profits and either retain them or pay them out as
dividends.6 2 It may indeed waste the money by purchasing a short-lived
monopoly position. Or, and this is most likely, it may be forced to pass these
efficiency savings on to customers with significant degrees of oligopsony
power. If the market involves products sold to industrial customers, for
example, two important characteristics should serve to exonerate effi-
ciencies. First, efficiencies in advertising and promotion, characterized as the
most onerous, 63 are not efficacious as tools of monopolization in industrial
products markets. Secondly, the customer in such a market is generally a
large volume buyer with sophisticated professionals handling the purchasing
function and will probably, with its buying power, force these dollars to be
passed along. In the consumer products area it must be borne in mind that
intense media advertising is not employed in many product categories. In-
deed, in many consumer products categories large expenditures in adver-
tising would be useless. Some products simply do not move off the shelf
because of a television commercial. In the few areas where intensity of tele-
vision advertising can be seen to be a potentially decisive factor, structural
relief may not be necessary to avert the feared consequences of large firm
entry via merger.
Undoubtedly, the most dangerous form of leverage in the concentric
merger context is reciprocity. Where the potential to use it is present, we
may assume that without some form of prevention it will be used.64 The
61 Selling costs -see E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
126-27 (4th ed. 1942); Blair, supra note 30, at 679-81. Advertising -see Procter & Gamble
Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binderi TRADE REc. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963), aff'd, 386 U.S.
568 (1967); Turner, supra note 30, at 1332-37. Access to capital generally-see FED.
RES. BD., STUDIES OF BANK LOAN RATES IN 1955 AND 1967 (1968); Archer & Faerber, Firm
Size and the Cost of Externally Acquired Equity Capital, 21 J. FINANCE 69-83 (1969); Ed-
wards, The Banking Competition Controversy, NAT'L BANKING RKE., Sept. 1965, at 1;
Shepard, Conglomerate Mergers in Perspective, 2 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON REV. 15, 28 (1968).
62 See NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT at 5645. Professor Edwards avers that this is a
certainty in an oligopoly market in that pricing will be administered anyway. Edwards,
supra note 39, at 344-48. See also Blair, Technology and Size, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 121
(1948). I will still persist in the notion that administered pricing is consistently a func-
tion of conspiracy, which does not bear on the relationship of the concentric merger
to structure.
63 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 (FTC
1963), aff'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
64 See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). Practically the only
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only question of consequence about reciprocity is how to stop it. It is no
more nor less than anticompetitive behavior that can be stopped injunctively
without resort to divestiture, and it should not be grounds for divestiture
under section 7 unless its post-merger use has already injured competitive
vigor.6 5
RELIEF
Those who would, with no more than the paucity of empirical data we
now possess, on purely structural grounds declare that the concentric merger
is a threat to competition, would with equal zest turn their thumbs down
at the end of the litigation and demand that there be a severance of heads.
Relief in section 7 matters has been built upon a framework of horizontal
and vertical mergers where the act of combination of firms is itself a lessen-
ing of the number of participants in the market or an act of foreclosure.
And even in these cases the courts have had nowhere to turn for guidance
but to older Sherman Act cases where the question was what to do once
monopolization has already been in flower. There is, however, no credible
analogy between those horizontal and vertical matters and the situation of
the firm entering a strange market, especially in the divergent concentric
merger, notwithstanding that the entering firm be large, be a participant in
other markets, or that a large number of firms in the entered market be
single industry firms. In this context the entering firm is at an immediate
disadvantage. Even though it retains the management of the acquired com-
pany, the investment risk is assumed by the parent, and there is an intelligent
reluctance to permit the acquired firm's management to embark upon
crusades for market share that involve a great likelihood of earnings dilu-
tion.
Dissolution and divestiture, 66 as remedies in corporate combination
cases, have become the standard since their debut in 1911 in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States.67 It is claimed, and perhaps rightly so in the setting of
the horizontal or vertical merger, that the very wording of section 7 suggests
dissenter on this point is Professor Bork, who views it as either neutral or beneficial,
and, in any event, a mere hobgoblin. Bork, supra note 39. For a review of the Con-
solidated Foods case and general bibliography on this subject, see S. OPPENHEIM & J.
WEsTON, supra note 9, at 408-15. Probably the only known instance of a firm abstaining
from the use of reciprocity where it might have had a chance to do so may be seen
in United States v. General Motors Corp. (Locomotive Case), 5 TRADE REG. REP.
45,063 (1967) (dismissed for lack of evidence).
65 See Address by George Stigler, supra note 38. There is, however, significant opinion
that, absent predatory application of reciprocity power, the structural relationships are
in themselves sufficiently pernicious to result in noncoercive reciprocity practice. FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320
F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963). There is no evidence that such a result, if actual, would be
of a magnitude sufficient to have cognizable section 7 implications.
66 fDivestiture would be an included remedy within dissolution. They differ only
in mechanics of application. See G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE
UNDER THE SHERMAN AcT 370 (1958).
67 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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that the undoing of an acquisition is a natural remedy. This is undoubtedly
a holdover from Sherman Act violations whose essence is intercorporate
combination and control. 68 That it flows naturally into the application of
section 769 to concentric mergers on the theory that section 7 is the new
abortion license law to facilitate pre-natal disposition of gestating monopoly
simply does not make sense.
To what, then, may we turn, short of declining to enforce section 7 at
all against concentric mergers? At least until we possess a significant body of
basic operating data on the effects upon market performance after acquisitive
concentric entry we have a middle ground, which would be to permit the
merger but impose injunctive restraints (marketing orders) upon certain
areas of conduct to minimize the risks that those advantages, seen by some
to be inherent in size, structure and leverage to a decisive degree, will be
brought to bear to those infelicitous ends. Indeed, there is as much, no,
more logic under the wording of section 7 to the adoption of this approach
than can be found to justify the simplistic "off with his head" divestiture
approach.70
There are, indeed, many dissenters from this view, but I suggest that
their dissent is based upon oversimplification of the problem and a search
for an easy way out, Sherman Act thinking, resentment that relief in merger
cases in general has been difficult of execution, or a desire to punish.71 If
68 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330 (1961).
69 Id.
70 "[Ijf anticompetitive effects of a merger are probable in 'any' significant market,
the merger - at least to that extent - is proscribed." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 337 (1962).
If two retailers, one operating primarily in the eastern half of the Nation, and
the other operating largely in the West, competed in but two mid-Western
cities, the fact that the latter outlets represented but a small share of each com-
pany's business would not immunize the merger in those markets in which com-
petition might be adversely affected. On the other hand, that fact would, of
course, be properly considered in determining the equitable relief to be de-
creed.
Id. at 337 n.65. That the courts and the FTC have wide latitude to fashion decrees
aimed at control of specific abuse is well settled. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,
478 (1952); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1947); Jacob Siegel Co. V. FTC,
327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946); Herzfeld v. FTC, 140 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944). "[T]he primary
focus of inquiry ...is upon the question of the relief required effectively to eliminate
the tendency of the acquisition condemned by § 7. The required relief therefore is a
remedy which reasonably assures the elimination of that tendency [toward monopoly]."
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S, 316, 325-26 (1961).
71 "Injunctive relief, that is, some form of order directing the acquiring firm to
behave as if it did not gain this market power, is clearly unacceptable." Elzinga, supra
note 26, at 45.
There still exists the attitude .. . that divestiture is a harsh and radical remedy:
it is better merely to substitute some injunctive order directing the respondent
to behave in a certain way, subject to governmental scrutiny. ...
Of course, this notion is false. Divestiture is a conservative remedy since it
eliminates the need for close regulation of future marketing activities.
Id. at 68. "Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It is
simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of
a court's mind when a violation of section 7 has been found." 366 U.S. at 331, "mhe
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punishment is properly to be considered under the Sherman Act, then so
be it. It should not be imposed where the standard of liability is conjecture
about future possibilities resulting from an inherently innocuous act. There
is even a question based upon the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver
amendment to section 7 whether, in non-horizontal mergers, anticompetitive
potentialities are to be prevented by behavioral sanctions.72
Irony of ironies! The cases in which moderated relief has been satis-
factory to the Government - in which they have accepted partial divestiture,
more than a marketing order yet less than complete dismemberment - have
involved mostly horizontal or market extension mergers.73 The marketing
order, with one notable exception, has been limited to agreements between
enforcement agency and defendant as to how the operation of the business
was to be carried on during litigation.74
The marketing order is a suitable disposition under section 7 for the
concentric merger case. Its provisions may, in the main, be easily worked
out. There is the great body of decrees in innumerable behavior cases under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 5 of the FTC Act, and sections 2 and
3 of the Clayton Act on which to draw and in the bizarre case imaginative
wording will flow swiftly from the fertile minds of opposing counsel. They
need not involve the Government in the day-to-day operations of the defen-
dants' business, and their efficacy can be maintained through a course of
vigorous antitrust enforcement in general. As the ultimate in protections,
in the event of failure of the marketing order, jurisdiction may be retained
for the purpose of seeking divestiture at a later date. 75
marketing order is a bastard form of antitrust regulation." Elzinga, supra note 26, at
74. "The structural enforcement standard [of section 7] requires structural relief ......
Id at 45. "As it turns out, relief decrees seldom result in truly independent firms." Id. at
46. "If all that was done was to forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct, those who
had unlawfully built their empires could preserve them intact. They could retain the
full dividend of their monopolistic practices .... ." Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948). United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323
U.S. 173, 189 (1944) (Sherman Act context). For a review of the full panoply of forces
militating for or against divestiture, see G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 66, at 370-77.
72 See Justice Burton's dissent in United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 608, at 614-15 nn. 7, 8, citing the remarks of Senators Reid and Cummins
during congressional deliberations leading up to the passage of the Act. 51 CONG. REa.
9272, 14,254-55, 14,419-20, 14,455 (1914) (remarks of Senators Reid & Cummins),
73 United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Hooker
Chem. Corp., 59 F.T.C. 254 (1961); Scovill Mfg. Co., 53 F.T.C. 260 (1956); Matter of
Standard Oil of Ohio, 437 BNA ANTIRUST & TRADE RzG. REP. A-16, A-17 (Nov. 25,
1969) (McLaren says Sohio Merger Settlement may set pattern), 436 BNA ANTITRUST &e
TRADE REG. REP. A-19 (Nov. 18, 1969) (Justice Dep't agrees to Sohio-British Petroleum
Merger); Matter of Rockwell Standard Corp., 330 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-16
(1967); United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 227 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RnP.
A-1l (1965 Atlantic Refining-Richfield Oil Co.).
74 E.g., acquired product line not to be advertised or promoted jointly with parent
company's products. Procter & Gamble Co. (Folgers), [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
RE. REP. 17,858 (FTC 1967). As to absolute limitations on advertising spending levels,
see MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, HOUSEHOLD PRODuaS 41-42, 44-45 (London 1966).
75 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953);
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ENFORCEMENT
In the final analysis, attacks against conglomerate mergers under section
7 of the Clayton Act are but a part of the concern about the condition of
markets in general. The entire issue is the extent to which this nation wishes
the performance of markets to resemble the results of the competitive model.
We cannot appease the national appetite for competition through bringing
the spectacular case in the area getting the most press coverage. Effective
regulation of business practices can only be achieved by a pervasive
antitrust enforcement program. And that is precisely the situation that does
not currently exist. Why we should be concerned, for example, with vague
and conjectural hypotheses about the potential for the concentric conglom-
erate merger to facilitate predatory pricing, price fixing, reciprocity and
other forms of restrictive practices, and not attack those self-same practices
as they occur in the non-merger context is a question for which there is no
rational answer.76
We have, in fact, been languishing in a permissive antitrust doldrum
for several years, stemming from a combination of inadequate enforcement
appropriations, political sentiment against adequate enforcement which
directly affects the degree of activity of the enforcement agencies,77 and the
total breakdown of effectiveness of the FTC.78 Our agencies are not enforc-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act or bringing cases in general trade restraint
areas.79 It cannot be expected that competition will be understood to be an
important national attribute, or that, without action, the business commu-
nity will take seriously either the enforcement agencies or the laws they
enforce.80 Speeches about what is ahead in enforcement do not substitute
for enforcement itself in these behavioral areas.
United States v. General Motors Corp. (The Bus Case), TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.)
71,624 (E.D. Mich. 1965). But cf. Kaysen and Turner to the effect that any policy of
permitting mergers and attacking the union subsequently if the anticompetitive poten-
tialities of the combination achieve fruition is wasteful and should be discarded. C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 127.
76 The response of Dr. Stelzer that section 7 is really not being enforced except to
protect comfortable, entrenched, old-line management in sluggish corporations who
happen to be friends of an administration, though intriguing, can be but an aside
comment, thoroughly ungermane to the principal issue of multi-lateral antitrust law
enforcement. See Stelzer, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerates, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
196 (1969).
77 See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 247; REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION
TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION, 34-35 (Sept. 1969).
78 The ABA Report ascribes this to the Commission's being mired in self-eviscerating
conflict at the topmost level and a haven for incompetents and appointed "friends" at
the staff level. In many respects, at least, its comments on the staff are inappropriate and
incorrect. When permitted to bring cases, the staff has an overall favorable won-lost
record while opposing the most high-powered antitrust defense counsel in the country.
In addition, personnel recruitment by law firms and corporation law departments still
place a premium on FTC experience when filling antitrust positions in their ranks. This
writer's experience is that in general the competence level of most of the FTC staff
compares well with that of the average corporate law department.
79 ABA REPORT, sura note 77, at 17, 18, 21, 67, 68.
80 Id. at 26.
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Congress has also contributed to this condition of lethargy. In the price
fixing area, for example, a maximum fine of $50,000 against a company
that may have enhanced its profitability by $50 million over a 5 to 10
year period is a joke. It is a sick joke, and its shame is compounded by
federal judges who consistently refuse to hand out stiff jail sentences and
permit hard core recidivists to plead nolo contendere, thereby making the
court an accessory to the suppression of treble damage claims. There are
only two ways to stop price fixing-jail and opening the doors for those
who have been victimized to recover damages.
CONCLUSION
The concentric conglomerate merger may be a threat, but that threat is
not directly related to market performance in the antitrust sense. The
dangers to the public at large stem more from investment risk factors than
from dangers that we shall all, because of the conglomerate phenomenon,
be mere serfs to industrial robber barons. We are ill advised to attack the
concentric merger under the undocumented hypothesis that its characteris-
tics are similar to those of horizontal, vertical or market extention mergers.
Ultimately, it is but self-delusion to vituperate about potentialities for
anticompetitive conduct in the section 7 setting and ignore the same conduct
in the same or more concentrated market structure framework where the
perpetrator is an established firm in the industry.
